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1 Introduction
Game theory is a well-established tool for studying interactions among self-interested play-
ers. Under the assumption of complete information on the game composition at each player,
the focal point of game-theoretic studies has been on the Nash equilibrium (NE) in analyzing
game outcomes and predicting strategic behaviors of rational players.
The difficulty in obtaining complete information in real-world applications gives rise
to the formulation of repeated unknown games, where each player has access to only local
information such as his own actions and utilities, but is otherwise unaware of the game
composition or even the existence of opponents. In such a setting, a rational player improves
his decision-making through real-time interactions with the system and learns from past
experiences [1]. The problem can be viewed through the lens of distributed online learning,
where the central question is whether learning dynamics of distributed players lead to a
system-level equilibrium in some sense. Studies in the past few decades have revealed
intriguing connections between various notions of no-regret learning at each player and
certain relaxed versions of NE at the system level [1, 2].
While one-step closer to real-world systems, repeated unknown games, in their canonical
forms, often adopt idealistic assumptions in terms of the stationarity of the player population
and their utilities, availability of complete and perfect feedback, full rationality of players
with unbounded cognition and computation capacity, and homogeneity among players in
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their knowledge of the game. Many emerging multi-agent systems, however, are inherently
dynamic and heterogeneous, and inevitably limited in terms of available information and
the cognition and computation capacity of the players. We give below two examples.
Example: adversarial machine learning. Security issues are at the forefront of machine
learning and deep learning research, especially in safety-critical and risk-sensitive applica-
tions. The interaction between the defender and the attacker can be modeled as a two-player
game. While the player population may be small, the game is highly complex in terms of
the action space, utilities, feedback models, and the available knowledge each player has
about the other. In particular, the attacker is characterized by its knowledge—how much
information it has for designing attacks—and power—how often a successful attack can be
launched. Both can be dynamically changing and adaptive to the strategies of the defender.
A full spectrum of attacker profiles has been considered, ranging from the so-called black-
box model to the white-box model (i.e., an omniscient attacker). The attack process is
also dynamic, often exhibiting bursty behaviors following a successful intrusion or a system
malfunction. The action space of the attacker can be equally diverse, including poison-
ing attacks and perturbation attacks. The former targets the training phase by injecting
corrupted labels and examples for the purpose of embedding wrong decision rules into the
machine learning algorithm. The latter targets the blind spots of a fully trained artificial
intelligence using strategically perturbed instances that trigger wrong outputs, even when
the perturbation is so minute as being indiscernible to humans. In terms of utilities, the
attacker’s goal may be to compromise the integrity of the system (i.e., to evade detection
by causing false negatives) or the availability of the system (to flood the system with false
positives). See a comprehensive taxonomy of attacks against machine learning systems in [3].
Example: transportation systems. Route selection in urban transportation is a typical ex-
ample of a non-cooperative game repeated over time. The game is characterized by a
large population of players that is both dynamic and heterogeneous, with vehicles leaving
and joining the system and utilities varying across players and over time. The envisioned
large-scale adoption of autonomous vehicles will further diversify the traffic composition.
Autonomous vehicles are significantly different from human drivers in terms of decision-
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making rationality, access to and usage of system-level knowledge, and memory and com-
putation power. Bounded rationality is more evident in human drivers: they are likely to
select a familiar route and inclined to settle for sufficing yet suboptimal options.
Complex multi-agent systems as in the above examples call for new game models, new
concepts of regret, new design of distributed learning algorithms, and new techniques for
analyzing game outcomes. We present in this article representative results on distributed no-
regret learning in multi-agent systems. We start in Sec. 2 with a brief review of background
knowledge on classical repeated unknown games. In the subsequent four sections, we explore
four game characteristics—dynamicity, incomplete and imperfect feedback, bounded ratio-
nality, and heterogeneity—that challenge the classical game models. For each characteristic,
we illuminate its implications and ramifications in game modeling, notions of regret, feasible
game outcomes, and the design and analysis of distributed learning algorithms. Limited by
our understanding of this expansive research field and constrained by the page limit, the
coverage is inevitably incomplete. We hope the article nevertheless provides an informative
glimpse of the current landscape of this field and stimulates future research interests.
2 Distributed Learning in Repeated Unknown Games
In this section, we review key concepts in game theory and highlight classical results on
distributed learning in repeated unknown games.
2.1 Static Games and Equilibria
An N -player static game is represented by a tuple G(N ,A, u), where N = {1, ..., N} is the
set of players, A = A1×· · ·×AN the Cartesian product of each player’s action space Ai, and
u = (u1, ..., uN ) the utility functions that capture the interaction among players. Specifi-
cally, the utility function ui of player i encodes his preference towards an action. It is a
mapping from the action profile a = (a1, ..., aN ) of all players to player i’s reward ui(a).
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is an action profile a∗ = (a∗1, ..., a∗N ) under which no player can
increase his reward via a unilateral deviation. Specifically, ui(a
∗) ≥ ui(a′i,a∗−i) for all i and
all a′i 6= a∗i , where a∗−i denotes the action profile after excluding player i. Due to the focus on
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Figure 1: Relations and properties of four types of equilibria [5].
deterministic actions (also called pure strategies), the resulting equilibrium is a pure Nash
equilibrium. A player may also adopt a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution si
over the action space. Correspondingly, a mixed Nash equilibrium is a product distribution
s∗ = s∗1 × · · · × s∗N under which the expected utility Ea∗∼s∗ [ui(a∗)] for every player i is no
smaller than that under a unilateral deviation s′i 6= s∗i in player i’s strategy. A game with
a finite population and a finite action space has at least one mixed NE but may not have
any pure NE [4].
NE is defined under the assumption that players adopt independent strategies (note
the product form of s∗). A more general equilibrium—correlated equilibrium (CE)—allows
correlation across players’ strategies. We note that for equilibrium definitions introduced
here, we focus on games with a finite action space. Specifically, a CE is a joint prob-
ability distribution s (not necessarily in a product form) satisfying Ea∼s[ui(ai,a−i)|ai] ≥
Ea∼s[ui(a′i,a−i)|ai] for all i, ai, and a′i, where the expectation is over the joint strategy s con-
ditioned on that the realized action of player i is ai. The concept of CE can be interpreted
by introducing a mediator, who draws an outcome a from s and privately recommends
action ai to player i. The equilibrium condition states that no player has the incentive
to deviate from the outcome of the correlated draw from s after his part is revealed. CE
can be further relaxed to the so-called coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE), which is a joint
distribution s satisfying Ea∼s[ui(a)] ≥ Ea∼s[ui(a′i,a−i)] for all i and all a′i 6= ai. Different
from CE, CCE imposes an equilibrium condition that is realization independent.
The four types of equilibria exhibit a sequential inclusion relation as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The more general set of strategy profiles (i.e., allowing correlated strategies across players)
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in CE and CCE may lead to higher expected utilities summed over all players. CE and
CCE can also be computed via linear programming, while pure NE and mixed NE are hard
to compute [4]. More importantly, CE and CCE are learnable through certain learning
dynamics of players when a game is played repeatedly as discussed next. A caveat is
that the set of CCE may contain highly non-rational strategies that choose only strictly
dominated actions (actions that are suboptimal responses to all action profiles of the other
players). See [6] for specific examples.
2.2 Repeated Unknown Games and No-Regret Learning
A repeated game consists of T repetitions of a static game (referred to as the stage game
in this context)1. In a repeated unknown game, after taking an action ati (potentially
randomized according to a mixed strategy) in the t-th stage, player i accrues a utility ui(a
t)
and observes the entire utility vector (ui(a
′
i,a
t
−i))a′i∈Ai for all actions a
′
i in his action space
(we focus on a finite action space here) against the action profile at−i of the other players.
The actions and utilities of the other players, however, are unknown and unobservable.
From a single player’s perspective, a repeated unknown game can be viewed as an online
learning problem where the player chooses actions sequentially in time by learning from
past experiences. A commonly adopted performance measure in online learning is regret,
defined as the cumulative reward loss against a properly defined benchmark policy with
hindsight vision and/or certain clairvoyant knowledge about the game. In other words, the
benchmark policy defines the learning objective that an online algorithm aims to achieve
over time. Different benchmark policies lead to different regret measures. Two classical
regret notions are the external regret and the internal regret as detailed below.
Let pii denote the online learning algorithm adopted by player i. For a fixed action
1In a general definition of a repeated game [7], the stage game is parameterized by a state, which affects
the utility function. Two basic settings exist in the literature: (i) the state evolves over time following a
Markov transition rule (the state in the next stage depends on the state and actions in the current stage);
(ii) the state is fixed throughout all stages. We focus on the second setting in discussing classical results on
repeated games.
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sequence {at−i}Tt=1 of the other players, the external regret of pii is defined as:
max
a′∈Ai
Epii
[
T∑
t=1
(ui(a
′,at−i)− ui(at))
]
, (1)
where Epii denotes the expectation over the random action process {ati}Tt=1 induced by pii.
In other words, the benchmark policy in the external regret chooses the best fixed response
to the other players’ actions in hindsight. The internal regret of pii is defined as:
max
a,a′∈Ai
Epii
[
T∑
t=1
I{ati = a}(ui(a′,at−i)− ui(at))
]
, (2)
where I{·} is the indicator function. In this definition, the benchmark policy is the best hind-
sight modification of pii by swapping a single action with another throughout all stages.
An online learning algorithm pii is said to achieve the no-regret condition if against all
action sequences {at−i}Tt=1 of the other players, the cumulative regret has a sublinear growth
rate with the time horizon T . In other words, pii offers, asymptotically as T →∞, the same
average reward per stage as the specific benchmark policy adopted in the corresponding
regret measure. No-regret learning is also referred to as Hannan consistency due to the
original work [8] as well as [9].
It is clear that the significance of no-regret learning depends on the adopted benchmark
policy which the learning algorithm is measured against. A benchmark policy with stronger
performance leads to a stronger notion of regret. In particular, the internal regret is a
stronger notion than the external regret: no-regret learning under the former implies no-
regret learning under the latter, but not vice versa [10].
A number of no-regret learning algorithms exist in the literature. Representative al-
gorithms achieving no-external-regret learning include Multiplicative Weights (MW) (also
known as the Hedge algorithm) and Follow the Perturbed Leader [1]. Both are randomized
policies, as randomization is necessary for achieving no-regret learning in an adversarial
setting with general reward functions [1]. In particular, under the MW algorithm, each
player maintains a weight Wa(t) of each action a at every stage t based on past rewards:
Wa(t) = e

∑t
τ=1 ra(τ) = Wa(t − 1)era(t), where ra(τ) is the reward received under a at
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stage τ and  > 0 is the learning rate. The probability of choosing a in the next stage is
proportional to its weight given by Wa(t)∑
a′ Wa′ (t)
.
For no-internal-regret learning, a representative algorithm is Regret Matching [11]. Let
Ra→a′(t) = 1t
∑t
τ=1 I{aτi = a}(ui(a′,aτ−i) − ui(aτ )) denote the average gain per play by
switching from action a to an alternative a′ in the past t plays. In the (t + 1)-th stage,
the probability of switching from the previous action at to an alternative a
′ is given by
1
R
at→a′(t), where  > 0 is a normalization parameter chosen to ensure a positive probability
of staying with action at. Regret Matching also offers no-external-regret learning by setting
the probability of selecting an action a at the (t + 1)-th stage to the normalized average
gain per play from playing action a throughout the past t plays, i.e., R
a(t)∑
a′ Ra
′ (t)
, where
Ra(t) = 1t
∑t
τ=1(ui(a,a
τ
−i)− ui(aτ )) [11].
2.3 System-Level Performance under No-Regret Learning
Regret captures the learning objective of an individual player. At the system level, it is
desirable to know whether the dynamical behaviors of distributed players converge to an
equilibrium in some sense and whether the self-interested regret minimization promises a
certain level of optimality in terms of social welfare.
For the first question, it has been shown that if every player adopts a no-external-
regret learning algorithm, the empirical distribution of the sequence of actions taken by all
players converges to the set of CCE of the stage game [5]. No-regret learning under the
internal regret measure guarantees convergence to the more restrictive set of CE [11]. Such
convergence results are, however, in terms of the empirical frequency of the players’ actions
rather than the actual sequence of plays. The convergence is also only to the set of equilibria,
rather than to an equilibrium in the corresponding set. In fact, by treating learning in games
as a dynamical system, recent studies have shown that in the continuous-time setting, the
actual plays under no-regret learning algorithms (such as Follow the Regularized Leader)
may exhibit cycles rather than convergence [12]. In the discrete-time setting, it has been
shown that in zero-sum games, the actual plays under the MW algorithm (starting from a
non-equilibrium initial strategy) diverges from every fully mixed NE [13]. For games with
special structures (e.g., potential games [14] with a finite action space and bilinear smooth
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games [15] with a continuum of actions), however, stronger results on the convergence of
the actual plays to the more restrictive set of (mixed) NE have been established.
In addition to the convergence of learning dynamics, the social welfare resulting from
the self-interested learning of individual players is of great interest in many applications.
In (known) static games, the loss in social welfare W (s) = Ea∼s
[∑N
i=1 ui(a)
]
(i.e., the
system-level utility under a strategy profile s) due to the self-interested behaviors of players
is quantified by the price of anarchy (POA). It is defined as the ratio of the optimal social
welfare OPT = maxsW (s) among all strategies to the smallest social welfare in the set of
mixed NE. For repeated unknown games, a corresponding concept, price of total anarchy
(POTA), is defined as:
OPT
mins1,...,sT
1
T
∑T
t=1W (s
t)
, (3)
where s1, ..., sT is the sequence of strategy profiles in the no-regret dynamics of all players.
It has been shown that in games with special structures (e.g., valid games and congestion
games), no-regret learning guarantees a POTA that converges to the POA of the stage
game even though the sequence of actual plays may not converge to a (mixed) NE [16]. The
convergence of the POTA to the POA of the stage game implies that no-regret learning
can fully negate the impact of the unknown nature of the game on social welfare. The
result was later extended in [5] to a general class of games referred to as smooth games
(which includes valid games and congestion games as special cases). To achieve higher social
welfare, cooperation among players is necessary. For example, if every player agrees to follow
a learning algorithm designed specifically for optimizing the system-level performance, the
optimal action profile will be selected a high percentage of time [17].
3 Dynamicity
In a dynamic repeated game, the stage game is time-varying. The dynamicity may be in
any of the three elements of the game composition: the set of players, the action space, and
the utility functions2.
2Note that the general definition of repeated games in [7] includes dynamicity in the utility function, as
the state parameter may evolve over time following a Markov transition rule. The dynamic repeated game
discussed in this section differs from the general repeated game in two aspects: (i) the set of players and the
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3.1 Notions of Regret
Dynamic unknown games call for new notions of regret to provide meaningful performance
measures for distributed online learning algorithms. Specifically, the benchmark policy of
a fixed single best action used in the external regret and that of a fixed single best action
modification used in the internal regret can be highly suboptimal in dynamic games. As a
result, achieving no-regret learning under thus-defined regret measures can no longer serve
as a stamp for good performance.
A rather immediate extension of the external regret is to consider every interval of the
learning horizon and measure the cumulative loss against a single best action in hindsight
that is specific to each interval. This leads to the notion of adaptive regret, under which no-
regret learning requires a sublinear growth of the cumulative reward loss in every interval
as the interval length tends to infinity. The adaptive regret is particularly suitable for
piecewise stationary systems where changes can be abrupt but infrequent. Classical learning
algorithms such as MW can be extended to achieve no-adaptive-regret [18]. The key issue
in algorithm design is a mechanism to discount experiences from the distant past.
Another extension of the external regret is the so-called dynamic regret, in which the
benchmark policy can be an arbitrary sequence of actions, as opposed to a fixed action
throughout an interval of growing length. Achieving diminishing reward loss against all
sequences of actions is, however, unattainable. Constraints on either the benchmark action
sequence or the reward functions are necessary for defining a meaningful measure. On the
variation of the benchmark action sequence, a commonly adopted constraint in the setting
with finite actions is that the benchmark sequence is piecewise-stationary with at most K
changes (the thus-defined regret is also referred to as the K-shifting regret). In this case,
the no-adaptive-regret condition directly implies no-dynamic-regret [18]. With a continuum
of actions, the constraint is often imposed on the cumulative distance between every two
consecutive actions in the sequence, i.e., VT ({at}Tt=1) =
∑T−1
t=1 ||at+1 − at||. It has been
shown that if the benchmark sequence is slow-varying, i.e., VT = o(T ), no-dynamic-regret
is achievable through well-designed restart procedures [19]. The variation constraint can
action space can also be time-varying; (ii) the utility functions are in general independent across stages.
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also be applied to the reward functions. A typical example with a continuum of actions
is the sublinear “variation budget” assumption. Specifically, the cumulative variation be-
tween the reward functions in two consecutive stage games grows sublinearly in T , i.e.,∑T−1
t=1 supa |ut+1(a) − ut(a)| = o(T ). Similar constraints can be imposed on the gradient
∇ut(a) of the utility function and with the variation measured by the Lp-norm. See [20]
and references therein for details and corresponding no-regret learning algorithms.
The external regret and its extensions are measured against an alternative strategy of
a single player. A new notion of regret—Nash equilibrium regret—considers a benchmark
policy that is jointly determined by the strategies of all players [21]. Consider a repeated
game with time-varying utility functions {uti}Tt=1 for each player i. Let u¯i = 1T
∑T
t=1 u
t
i be
the average utility function and s∗ the mixed NE of the static game defined by the average
utility functions u¯ = (u¯1, ..., u¯N ). The NE regret of player i following a policy pii is then
given by Epi[
∑T
t=1 u
t
i(a
t)] − TEa∗∼s∗ [u¯i(a∗)], where at is the action profile selected by the
policies pi = (pi1, ..., piN ) of all players at stage t. No-regret learning under the NE regret
ensures that each player’s average reward asymptotically matches that promised by the
mixed NE under the average utility functions. A centralized learning algorithm achieving
no-NE-regret was developed in [21] for repeated two-player zero-sum games with arbitrarily
varying utility functions. Achieving no-regret learning under the measure of NE regret in a
distributed setting, however, remains open.
3.2 System-Level Performance
The two key measures—convergence to equilibria and POTA—for system-level perfor-
mance also need to be modified to take into account game dynamics. The time-varying
sequence {Gt}Tt=1 of stage games defines a sequence of equilibria and a sequence {OPTt}Tt=1
of optimal social welfare. The desired relation between no-regret learning dynamics at in-
dividual players and the system-level equilibria is thus in terms of tracking rather than
converging. For the definition of POTA, the optimal social welfare in the numerator in (3)
needs to be replaced with the average optimal social welfare 1T
∑T
t=1 OPT
t.
An online learning algorithm is said to successfully track the sequence of (mixed) NE
in a dynamic game if the average distance between the sequence of (mixed) action profiles
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resulting from the algorithm and the sequence of (mixed) NE vanishes as T tends to infinity.
A representative study in [19] considers a game with a continuum of actions and dynamicity
manifesting only in the utility functions. Under the assumptions that the sequence of NE is
slow-varying and the utility functions are monotonic, it was shown that learning algorithms
with sublinear dynamic regret successfully track the sequence of NE. The monotonicity of
the utility functions plays a key role in the analysis: it translates the closeness between
the learning dynamics and the NE in terms of the cumulative reward (as in the regret
measure) to the closeness in terms of their distance in the action space (the concern of the
tracking outcome).
The performance of no-regret learning in terms of social welfare was studied in [22]
for games with a dynamic population of players. Specifically, in each stage, each player
may independently exit with a fixed probability and is subsequently replaced with a new
player with a potentially different utility function (the population size is therefore fixed and
the player set is a stationary process over time). For structural games such as first-price
auctions, bandwidth allocation, and congestion games, the relation between no-adaptive-
regret learning and the average optimal social welfare was examined.
Game dynamics can be in diverse forms. There lacks a holistic understanding on the
matching between regret notions and the underlying dynamics of the game. Different forms
of game dynamics demand different benchmark policies in order to arrive at a meaningful
regret measure that lends significance to the stamp of “no-regret learning” yet at the same
time is attainable. Viewing from a different angle, one may pose the fundamental question
on what kinds of game dynamics are tamable through distributed online learning and make
no-regret learning and approximately optimal social welfare feasible.
4 Incomplete and Imperfect Feedback
Learning and adaptation rely on feedback. Quality of the feedback in terms of completeness
and accuracy thus has significant implications in no-regret learning. We explore this issue
in this section.
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4.1 Incomplete Feedback
Incomplete feedback stands in contrast to full-information feedback where utilities of all
actions a player could have taken are observed in each stage. Incompleteness can be spatial
across the action space or temporal across decision stages. In the former case, a commonly
studied model is the so-called bandit feedback, where only the utility of the chosen action
is revealed. In the latter, the feedback model is referred to as lossy feedback where there
are decision stages with no feedback [23]. One can easily envision a more general model
compounding bandit feedback with lossy feedback. Studies on this general model are lacking
in the literature.
The term “bandit feedback” has its roots in the classical problem of multi-armed ban-
dit [24]. The name of the problem comes from likening an archetypical single-player online
learning problem to playing a multi-armed slot machine (known as a bandit for its ability of
emptying the player’s pocket). Each arm, when pulled, generates rewards according to an
unknown stochastic model or in an adversarial fashion. Only the reward of the chosen arm
is revealed after each play. Due to the incomplete feedback, the player faces the tradeoff
between exploration (to gather information from less explored arms) and exploitation (to
maximize immediate reward by favoring arms with a good reward history).
In a multi-player game setting with bandit feedback, no-regret learning from an indi-
vidual player’s perspective can be cast as a single-player non-stochastic/adversarial bandit
model where the payoff of each arm/action is adversarially chosen and aggregates the inter-
action with the other players in the game. The concept of external regret in the game setting
corresponds to the weak regret in the adversarial bandit model [25], which adopts the best
single-arm policy in hindsight as the benchmark. The MW algorithm was modified in [25]
to handle the change of the feedback model from full-information to bandit. Specifically,
the weight Wa(t) of action a at time t is updated as Wa(t) = Wa(t − 1)era(t)/pa(t) where
pa(t) is the probability of selecting action a at time t and ra(t) = 0 if a is unselected. Divid-
ing the observed reward by the corresponding probability of the chosen action ensures the
unbiasedness of the observation. Quite intuitively, the price for not observing the rewards
of all actions is the degradation of the regret order in the size of the action space, i.e., from
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Θ(
√
log(|A|)T ) in the full-information setting [1], to Θ(√|A|T ) in the bandit setting [26].
The multi-player bandit problem explicitly models the existence of N players competing
for M (M > N) arms [27]. Originally motivated by applications in wireless communication
networks where distributed users compete for access to multiple channels, this specific game
model is characterized by a special form of interaction among players: a collision occurs
when multiple players select the same arm, which results in utility loss. The objective of this
distributed learning problem is to minimize the system-level regret over all players against
the optimal centralized (hence collision-free) allocation of the players to the best set of
arms [27]. In addition to the exploration-exploitation tradeoff in the single-player setting,
this distributed learning problem under a system-level objective also faces the tradeoff
between selecting a good arm and avoiding colliding with competing players. A number
of distributed learning algorithms have been developed to achieve a sublinear system-level
regret with respect to T [27]. Recent extensions of the multi-player bandit problem further
consider the setting where each arm offers different payoffs across players [28].
The multi-player bandit problem is a special game model in that the players have iden-
tical action space and their interaction is only in the form of “collisions” when choosing
the same action. In a general game setting, the impact of incomplete feedback on no-
regret learning and system-level performance is largely open. One quantitative measure of
the impact is the regret order with respect to the size of the action space. As mentioned
above, bandit feedback results in an additional
√|A| term in the regret order, which can
be significant when the action space is large. Recent work [29, 30] has shown that local
communications among neighboring players in a network setting can mitigate the negative
impact of bandit feedback on the regret order in |A|. In terms of the impact on the system-
level performance, it has been shown under a game model with a continuum of actions that
bandit feedback degrades the convergence rate of the learning dynamics to equilibria [31].
4.2 Imperfect Feedback
Imperfect feedback refers to the inaccuracy of the observed utilities in revealing the quality
of the selected actions. Recall that mixed strategies are necessary for achieving no-regret
learning in the adversarial setting. The quality of a mixed strategy is characterized by
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the expected utility where the expectation is taken over the randomness of strategies of all
players. Referred to as expected feedback, the feedback model assuming observations on the
expected utility, however, can be unrealistic. A more commonly adopted feedback model
is the realized feedback where only the utility of the realized action profile is revealed. The
realized feedback can be viewed as a noisy unbiased estimate of the expected feedback where
the noise is due to the randomness of players’ strategies.
The so-called noisy feedback assumes a different source of noise: it comes from the ex-
ternal environment and is additive to either the observed utility vectors in the so-called
semi-bandit feedback [14] with a finite action space, or the gradient of the utility functions
in the first-order feedback [32] with a continuum of actions. Under the assumptions of un-
biasedness and bounded variance, the issue of the additive noise can be addressed by rather
standard estimation techniques and analysis. A more challenging setting is to consider
non-stochastic noise due to adversarial attacks, especially in applications such as adversar-
ial machine learning. This problem was recently studied in the single-player setting [33].
Studies in the multi-agent setting are still lacking.
5 Bounded Rationality
The concept of bounded rationality was first introduced in economics [34] to provide more
realistic models than the often adopted perfect rationality that assumes the decision-making
of players is the result of a full optimization of their utilities. In reality, players often take
reasoning shortcuts that may lead to suboptimal decisions. Such reasoning shortcuts may
be a result of limited cognition of human minds or necessitated by the available computation
time and power relative to the complexity of action optimization.
Cognitive limitations include the limited ability in anticipating other decision-makers’
strategic responses and certain psychological factors that interfere with the valuation of op-
tions. Various models exist for capturing the limitations in the players’ valuation of options.
For example, a player may be myopic, focusing only on the short-term reward [35]. Even
with forward-thinking, a player may settle for suboptimal actions perceived as acceptable
by the player [34]. The limitation in a player’s ability to anticipate other players’ strate-
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gies can be modeled through a cognitive hierarchy by grouping players according to their
cognitive abilities and characterizing them in an iterative fashion. Specifically, players with
the lowest level of cognitive ability are grouped as the level-0 players who make decisions
randomly. Level-k (k > 0) players are then defined iteratively as those who assume they
are playing against lower-level players and anticipate the opponents’ strategies accordingly.
Recent work draws an interesting connection between the cognitive hierarchy model and the
Optimistic Mirror Descent (OMD) algorithm for solving the saddle point problem with ap-
plications in generative adversarial networks [36]. The saddle-point problem can be viewed
as a two-player zero-sum game with a continuum of actions. The solutions to the problem
correspond to the set of NE. It has been shown that the OMD algorithm guarantees a con-
verging system dynamic to an NE in terms of the actual plays while Gradient Descent (GD)
may lead to cycles [36]. In the language of cognitive hierarchy, players adopting GD can be
regarded as level-0 thinkers in the sense that they do not anticipate the strategies of their
opponents. Players adopting OMD are level-1 thinkers since they take advantage of the fact
that their opponents are taking similar gradient methods, which will not lead to abrupt gra-
dient changes between two consecutive stages [36]. Consequently, an extra gradient update
is applied in OMD to accelerate learning.
Besides cognitive limitations, players are also constrained in terms of physical resources
such as memory and computation power. Acquiring, storing, and processing all relevant in-
formation for decision-making may be infeasible, especially in complex systems with a large
action space. For example, players may only choose from strategies with bounded complex-
ity [37], or use only recent observations in decision-making due to memory constraints [38].
While models for bounded rationality abound in economics, political science, and other
related disciplines, incorporating such models into distributed online learning is still in its
infancy. A holistic understanding on the implications of bounded rationality in distributed
online learning is yet to be gained. An intriguing aspect of the problem is that bounded
rationality may not necessarily imply degraded performance. For example, in dynamic
games, bounded memory of past experiences may have little effect since no-regret learning
dictates that the distant past be forgotten (see discussions in Sec. 3).
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6 Heterogeneity
The heterogeneity of complex multi-agent systems characterizes the asymmetry across play-
ers in three aspects: the available information and knowledge about the system, available
actions, and the level of adaptivity to opponents’ strategies. In the example of mixed
traffic in urban transportation, autonomous vehicles, while likely to have greater computa-
tion power for solving complex decision problems, may have to obey an additional set of
regulations on available actions.
In adversarial machine learning, in addition to the asymmetry on the knowledge and
power, the attacker and the defender may also have different levels of real-time adaptivity to
the other player’s strategy. Classical regret notions such as the external regret that assumes
fixed actions of the other players, while applicable to oblivious attackers, are no longer valid
under adaptive attacks. A partial solution is to adopt a new notion of policy regret defined
against an adaptive adversary who assigns reward vectors based on previous actions of the
player [39]. Specifically, let ut(·; a1:t−1) denote the player’s reward function determined by
the adversary at time t, given the sequence of actions a1:t−1 taken by the player in the past.
The policy regret with reward functions {ut}Tt=1 is defined as
max
a∈A
E
[
T∑
t=1
ut(a; {a, ..., a})−
T∑
t=1
ut(at; a1:t−1)
]
, (4)
where ut(·; {a, ..., a}) denotes the reward function determined by the adversary if the player
took actions {a, ..., a} in the past. The m-memory policy regret is defined by assuming that
the reward function depends only on the past m actions of the player.
The difference between the external regret and the policy regret may not be crucial if the
adversary and the player have homogeneous objectives (e.g., mixed traffic in transportation
systems). It has been shown that there exists a wide class of algorithms that can ensure
no-regret learning under both regret definitions, as long as the adversary is also using such
an algorithm [40]. In applications such as adversarial machine learning where the adversary
may be a malicious opponent, the two notions of regret are incompatible: there exists an m-
memory adaptive adversary that can make any action sequence of the player with sublinear
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regret in one notion suffer from linear regret in the other [40]. A general technique for
developing no-policy-regret algorithms in the single-player setting was proposed in [39]. In
terms of the system-level performance, it was shown in two-player games that no-policy-
regret learning guarantees convergence of the system dynamic to a new notion of equilibrium
called policy equilibrium [40]. However, the understanding of policy equilibrium is limited.
In games with more than two players, even the definition of policy equilibrium is unclear.
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